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Right Question, Wrong Answer: 
A Response to Professor Epstein  
and the “Permititis” Challenge 
Ralph F. Hall†  
  INTRODUCTION   
Professor Epstein’s article1 on FDA regulation of drugs 
forces us to think about life and death issues and personal 
freedom. It forces us to address a complex balance of competing 
and sometimes contradictory values, goals, and policies. We 
have come to expect no less from his writings. While he has 
asked the right question, I must respectfully dissent from his 
answer. His solution devalues the benefit of the government 
regulatory system, flies in the face of real-world experience, 
and cannot be implemented as he envisions.  
The tragic story of Abigail Burroughs puts a very real and 
human face on what otherwise can sound like esoteric philo-
sophic issues or regulatory nerds debating obscure (and Epstein 
might even say obscene) regulations. The short version of her 
story is as follows: Abigail Burroughs was diagnosed with can-
cer at age nineteen. Standard medical therapies failed. Her phy-
sicians concluded that her only chance to live was to try either of 
two new, experimental drugs. Neither drug was then FDA ap-
proved. As such, they were not available for her use and she 
didn’t qualify for any clinical trials. After a full disclosure of 
risks, she decided she wanted to try either of these drugs any-
 
†  Distinguished Professor and Practitioner, University of Minnesota 
Law School; Counsel, Baker & Daniels, Indianapolis, Indiana and Washing-
ton, D.C.; CEO, MR3 Medical LLC. Copyright © 2010 by Ralph F. Hall. 
 1. Richard A. Epstein, Against Permititis: Why Voluntary Organizations 
Should Regulate the Use of Cancer Drugs, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2009). It is im-
portant to note that Epstein is not arguing that current law supports his posi-
tion. Rather, he concedes that current law would need major revision in order 
to implement his concepts. See id. at 41. Given this approach, his article and 
this Response focus primarily on policy issues.  
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way—it was literally her last chance. Her doctors agreed with 
her decision. However, FDA regulations prevented her from 
gaining access to either drug. She died of cancer at age twenty-
one.2  
Ironically, the drugs she wanted were later approved by 
the FDA within months of her death. Whether they would have 
helped her will never be known. But FDA regulations deprived 
her of the chance to try a potentially lifesaving drug. Ms. Bur-
roughs’s story is a stark reminder that initial access to new 
drugs in the United States is currently controlled by the FDA, 
not the patient or physician, and that these decisions have life 
and death consequences.3  
Epstein’s article proposes a different answer; namely that 
Ms. Burroughs and her physicians, not the FDA, should have 
the right to make the decision regarding whether to use a par-
ticular therapy. The crux of Professor Epstein’s proposal is that 
patients and voluntary professional medical organizations 
should make these decisions once very basic safety concerns 
(such as toxicology or pharmacology) have been assessed by the 
FDA.4 
Under his construct, volunteer professional medical associ-
ations would assess overall drug efficacy and relative therapeu-
tic efficacy between and among therapeutic options. This in-
formation would be translated into practice guidelines or other 
decision support tools to be used by the medical community, the 
individual doctor, and the patient to decide which drug to use.5  
 
 2. See Our Story, http://www.abigail-alliance.org/story.php (last visited 
Apr. 13, 2010) (describing the facts surrounding the Abigail Burroughs story). 
See also the three key Abigail Alliance cases: Abigail Alliance for Better Access 
to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en 
banc), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008); Abigail Alliance for Better Access to 
Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 445 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2006); and 
Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. McClellan, No. 
03-1601 (RMU), 2004 WL 3777340, at *1 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2004). The policy 
arguments advanced by Epstein were largely argued and rejected by the D.C. 
Court of Appeals in the 2007 en banc decision. 495 F.3d at 703.  
 3. Epstein focuses on cancer drugs. He asserts that cancer drugs present 
the best case for government control given the risks of many cancer therapies. 
Epstein, supra note 1, at 4. From my perspective, cancer drugs may actually 
present the best argument for minimal government control given the critical 
nature of the disease, lack of therapeutic options, high levels of physician in-
volvement, minimal risk to third parties and the need for prompt medical ac-
tion.  
 4. Id. at 41.  
 5. Id. at 6–8. 
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Policymakers and the FDA must, however, consider more 
than Abigail Burroughs. They must also consider the need to 
protect vulnerable patients from bad medicine and medical and 
economic fraud, and the need to promote scientifically accurate 
assessments of new therapies. 
Epstein’s position raises two broad sets of issues. The first 
set involves philosophical, legal, ethical, and policy issues. 
Should someone like Abigail Burroughs have the ultimate and 
essentially unregulated power to decide what drug to take?6 
What is the balance between personal choice and government 
protection, particularly with vulnerable populations? How do 
we address the charlatans, quack therapies, and snake oil sales-
men preying on desperate people? If the government is to play 
a major role, then one must determine how, to what extent, and 
based on what factors.  
After providing a brief history of FDA regulatory schemes 
in Part I, Part II addresses these issues, to which there are no 
easy answers. However, Epstein downplays the negative rami-
fications of an “open access” policy. When faced with these neg-
atives, policymakers and the public have insisted on a (never 
perfect) balance between allowing access and protecting pa-
tients. It is important to understand that the current regulato-
ry structure actually already provides significant access to un-
approved drugs, thus moderating the impact of Epstein’s policy 
concerns. 
The second set of issues is more practical. Epstein’s posi-
tion requires accepting the fundamental and outcome-critical 
assumptions that the medical profession will develop the 
needed information in a reliable and timely fashion, practition-
ers will generally conform their medical practice to those de-
terminations, and patients can and will understand the com-
plex scientific information. 
Parts III and IV set forth the crux of my disagreement with 
Epstein on these issues. We know from both history and an un-
derstanding of the current systems and structures that his pro-
posed solution will not work as he intends it to. Even if one 
tends to agree with his philosophical points, his solution is im-
practical.  
 
 6. As the concepts and issues are similar, I will not separately discuss 
biologics or medical devices except as relevant to illustrate some specific point.  
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There are serious issues with the slowness of current regu-
latory processes,7 reduced patient autonomy, the FDA’s impact 
in restricting patient choice, and the existing bottleneck on new 
therapies.8 However, I respectfully dissent with regards to Eps-
tein’s proposed solution. Unaddressed policy issues and prac-
tical reality, both past and present, call into serious question 
whether the medical profession is capable of meeting this chal-
lenge or is even the appropriate body to assume this responsi-
bility.  
Currently, under the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic 
Act,9 the FDA must approve a “new drug”10 before it can be dis-
tributed (whether for profit or not) in the United States outside 
of an FDA-approved clinical trial.11 To be approved, the drug12 
must be shown to be “safe” and “effective” for its intended (or 
“labeled”)13 purpose.14 Safety and efficacy must be established 
by well-controlled clinical studies15 (usually multiple double-
blind, placebo-controlled studies in the case of drugs). General-
ly, new drugs go through a three-part clinical testing schema. 
Phase I studies, designed to elicit basic safety data, are con-
 
 7. Epstein correctly differentiates issues of agency authority and power 
from issues regarding agency capabilities (funding, resources, political will, 
and so on). I will endeavor to follow his lead and focus on the fundamental au-
thority/power questions. 
 8. Nothing is this commentary should be viewed as criticizing individual 
FDA employees or decisions. In my experience, the vast majority of FDA em-
ployees are conscientious individuals who care about public health.  
 9. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (2006). 
 10. Id. § 321(p) (defining “new drug”). New drugs must also go through a 
testing and approval process. Id. § 355. Section 355(a) requires an approved 
New Drug Application (NDA) prior to distribution. Id. § 355(a). 
 11. New drugs undergo clinical testing under the “Investigational New 
Drug” or IND process. 21 U.S.C. § 355(i) (2006 & Supp. 2009); 21 C.F.R. § 312 
(2009) (explaining the requirements of IND applications for FDA approval). 
 12. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g) (2006) (defining “drug”). Epstein’s article focuses on 
“drugs.”  
 13. Id. § 321(m) (defining “labeling”). 
 14. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)–(d); 21 C.F.R. § 314. Note that neither “safety” nor 
“efficacy” is explicitly defined by statute. The same access issues can apply to 
biologics. See 42 U.S.C. § 262(a) (2006 & Supp. 2009) (providing that a biolog-
ics license shall be issued upon a sufficient demonstration that the product is 
safe); 21 C.F.R. § 601.2. Similar issues may arise regarding certain medical 
devices. See 21 U.S.C. § 360e; 21 C.F.R. § 814.2. The details may differ be-
tween these regulatory structures but the basic concepts and issues remain. 
As such we will focus on the drug provisions but acknowledge the existence of 
these other FDA regulatory systems.  
 15. See FOOD AND DRUG LAW AND REGULATION 323 (David G. Adams et 
al. eds., 2008). 
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ducted on approximately 80–100 healthy volunteers. Phase II 
and III studies are conducted on larger groups of subjects with 
the disease or condition being studied, and assess both safety 
and efficacy. There are generally approximately 200–300 sub-
jects in Phase II studies and often multiple thousands of pa-
tients enrolled in Phase III studies.16 The Abigail Alliance and 
Epstein in essence argue that patients should have free access 
to the drug after the drug has successfully completed Phase I 
studies. Epstein proposes eliminating the FDA’s approval role 
once basic safety has been established via some form of Phase I 
studies. Professional medical and scientific societies would in-
stead serve as the key information source for physicians. He 
contends that this approach would improve access to new 
drugs, decrease delays in access, and increase patient autono-
my or control without exposing patients to any significant 
risks. He further contends that these voluntary professional or-
ganizations will provide better overall decisions and can re-
spond faster than the FDA to new information. 
Interestingly, once a drug is approved for any one purpose, 
a physician is generally free to use it for any other purpose.17 
This “off-label” use can actually be the standard of care. The 
irony of the Abigail Burroughs situation is that if the drug she 
wanted had been FDA-approved for some totally unrelated 
purpose—hair loss, acne, ingrown toenail—she could have got-
ten access without any FDA interference. This stark paradox 
certainly calls into question the public protection rationale used 
to support the current structure. If the FDA need not review 
and approve off-label uses before patient use, why must the 
FDA review on-label uses before allowing patient access? This 
paradox certainly supports Epstein’s criticism of the current 
structure. 
His bottom line is that the current policy and the power 
balance between the individual and the state is wrong, and 
that we need substantially more patient autonomy and author-
ity by moving the power to control access to new drugs from the 
government to the patient, physician, and professional socie-
ties. He contends that voluntary medical associations are better 
positioned than the FDA to collect therapeutic related data, 
particularly regarding rare diseases.18 “A national (or even 
global) network [of voluntary associations] can better accumu-
 
 16. Id. at 326–27. 
 17. 21 U.S.C. § 396 (2006). 
 18. Epstein, supra note 1, at 29. 
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late information on rare diseases by publishing resources more 
rapidly than any federal agency.”19 In essence, he proposes a 
material reduction in the role of the FDA in favor of an in-
creased role for the medical profession and companies. Specifi-
cally, he asserts, “The FDA’s permit power is an open wound in 
the body politic . . . it should be eliminated.”20 He is clear that 
his position is an outlier.21 Very few other commentators go as 
far as he does. He is one of the few to argue that: “The govern-
ment-run FDA should step out of the approval and permit 
process—after the completion of Phase I clinical trials—thereby 
allowing decisions to rest in the hands of patients and their 
physicians.”22 
I.  PAST APPROACHES   
Epstein is not the first to address the balance between pa-
tient autonomy and government control. A short history de-
monstrates that this balance varied over time.  
Pre-1906: Before 1906, there was essentially no federal 
regulation of drugs. The balance was clearly tipped towards the 
patient who had essentially complete access. 
1906–1938: The first Pure Food and Drug Act was passed 
in 1906. This Act did not include any premarket approval or 
control mechanisms, but made it illegal to distribute an “adul-
terated” or “misbranded” drug. During this time, the balance 
remained tilted towards patient autonomy—enforcement was 
after the fact and generally triggered by patient harm. This ap-
proach came under attack in the mid-1930s with the elixir of 
sulfanilamide tragedy in which several hundred individuals, 
including many children, died because of an antibiotic prepara-
tion that included diethylene glycol—a known poison. 
1938–1962: In response to the sulfanilamide tragedy, in 
1938 Congress passed the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act 
(FDCA),23 giving the FDA the role of “gatekeeper” for approving 
“new drugs”24 for distribution. Here we see the balance chang-
ing towards some (but not unlimited) government control over 
access, up to the point when safety (but not efficacy) was estab-
 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 41. 
 21. Id. at 40. 
 22. Id. at 23. 
 23. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (2006). 
 24. Id. § 321(p) (prohibiting the introduction of new drugs into interstate 
commerce without first obtaining approval). 
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lished.25 Then, in the early 1950s, statutory regulation of pre-
scription (Rx) drugs was implemented, requiring a physician 
prescription for access to Rx drugs.26 Under this system the 
physician is a key gatekeeper and part of a growing system to 
regulate access to drugs in the name of patient protection. In 
many ways, Epstein is proposing a return to the 1950–1962 
era, when the FDA would review drugs for safety but not effica-
cy and then let patients, physicians, and professional societies 
decide from there.  
Post-1962: In 1962, in response to another tragedy—this 
time regarding thalidomide—Congress created the current 
overall premarket approval structure (although there have 
been some important modifications since this date). The cur-
rent structure requires the FDA to review a new drug for both 
safety and efficacy.27 Clinical trials were carefully controlled 
and tremendous volumes of data had to be generated. The first 
years of this post-1962 period mark the apex of FDA control 
over access. 
1970s: During this time, public attention began to focus on 
cancer and cancer treatments, and access issues started to be-
come important policy issues. For example, in the 1970s a drug 
called laetrile got tremendous attention from cancer patients 
(and the media). Some claimed that it was the “magic bullet” 
against cancer. Unfortunately, the science did not bear out 
these claims. Despite the lack of scientific support, a number of 
people, demanded access to laetrile in the name of patient au-
tonomy. The FDA refused to approve laetrile or to make it gen-
erally available. Multiple patients filed lawsuits asserting a 
right to access laetrile, culminating in the Supreme Court deci-
sion in United States v. Rutherford.28 In Rutherford, the Court 
rejected arguments that the FDCA did not apply to drugs for 
terminal illnesses and upheld the FDA’s control over new drug 
approvals and access.29 
 
 25. The statute has separate safety and efficacy provisions for historical 
reasons. There is no such thing as absolute safety (every drug has a side ef-
fect) or absolute efficacy. Separating these concepts does a disservice as safety 
can only be determined with reference to efficacy and vice versa. The agency 
and other stakeholders often use the risk/benefit language in lieu of safety and 
efficacy. This statutory disconnect between safety and efficacy is outside the 
scope of this paper but deserves attention. 
 26. 21 U.S.C. § 353(b). 
 27. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (2006 & Supp. 2009). 
 28. 442 U.S. 544 (1979). 
 29. Id. at 551–54. 
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1980s: In the 1980s, cancer and AIDS activists became in-
creasingly critical of the FDA’s role in limiting access to drugs 
for life-threatening conditions. Pressure from these groups led 
to a number of regulatory adjustments designed to speed 
access.30 Congress also eased the regulatory pathway for drugs 
and devices intended to treat small populations (so-called or-
phan drugs) in an effort to increase product development and 
access.31 This provided somewhat faster access for certain 
products, but did not eliminate much of the FDA’s role as the 
gatekeeper. 
2000s: In the current era, the Abigail Alliance case was the 
lightning rod in the ongoing battle to balance access with pa-
tient protection. The Abigail Alliance argued that there is a 
substantive due process right for terminally ill patients, with a 
physician prescription, to have access to experimental drugs 
that had completed Phase I testing—essentially the position 
advanced by Epstein. After a three-judge panel found in favor 
of the Abigail Alliance, the D.C. Court of Appeals rejected the 
substantive due process argument.32 This remains the current 
state of the case law. However, the political pressure generated 
by this case helped push the FDA towards further regulatory 
changes intended to permit expanded access in limited cir-
cumstances.33 In addition, the FDA now posts information on-
line on how to get access to experimental drugs34 and informa-
 
 30. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 356 (2006 & Supp. 2009) (providing for a “fast 
track” approval process). Interestingly, the fast track process has some of the 
features argued for by Professor Epstein. There was also pressure on the FDA 
to increase its timeliness and actually meet the deadlines provided by statute. 
21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(1) (2006) (imposing a 180-day deadline on the FDA to com-
plete its review of a New Drug Application). 
 31. 21 U.S.C. §§ 360aa–360ee (2006 & Supp. 2009). 
 32. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von 
Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 722–24 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc), cert. denied, 128 
S. Ct. 1069 (2008).  
 33. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., ACCESS TO INVESTIGATIONAL DRUGS, 
http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ByAudience/ForPatientAdvocates/Accessto 
InvestigationalDrugs/default.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2010) (providing an 
overview of the FDA’s approach towards access to investigational drugs). 
There have been some other more unusual and fact-specific access cases. See, 
e.g., Gunvalson v. PTC Therapeutics, Inc., 303 F. App’x 128, 130 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(rejecting on factual grounds a promissory estoppel claim based on allegations 
that a company had promised a patient access to a later clinical trial if the pa-
tient did not seek entry into a more preliminary study). 
 34. See U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Access to Investigational Drugs Out-
side of a Clinical Trial, http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ByAudience/For 
PatientAdvocates/AccesstoInvestigationalDrugs/ucm176098.htm (last visited 
Apr. 13, 2010). 
  
58 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW HEADNOTES [94:50 
 
tion on all clinical trials underway.35 While not unlimited, this 
access does provide some relief from the rigidity of the Investi-
gational New Drug (IND) and New Drug Application (NDA) 
processes36 and some level of enhanced access. 
Changes in the regulatory system, particularly those since 
1962, illustrate the search for the right balance between pa-
tient autonomy and public health. That balancing process con-
tinues—to the complete satisfaction of no one. By way of exam-
ple, Representative Diane Watson recently introduced 
legislation to expand access to unapproved drugs.37 Whether 
this legislation will actually result in change is unknown.  
II.  THE POLICY DILEMMA   
A. THE TWO COMPETING INTERESTS 
One cannot help but look at the Abigail Burroughs situa-
tion and lament her situation and her loss of autonomy. She 
was young, intelligent, and vibrant, had the counsel of the best 
doctors, and wanted a product that was a legitimate (and the 
only) option. If you were in her position, would you not demand 
access to the one drug that might save you?  
Likewise, one cannot help but be worried about vulnerable 
cancer patients, desperate for any hope, who fall victim to med-
ical fads, quacks, incomplete information, false cures, and out-
right fraud. Diverting public health care funds from legitimate 
treatment options to “miracle cures” creates real financial loss 
and represents a significant lost-opportunity cost. Valuable 
medical study and data collection opportunities go by the way-
side. More importantly, patients may be bypassing better 
treatments based on false claims of miracle cures. The FDA re-
cognizes that this is a real problem. As one FDA official ex-
plained, “[H]armful products [include] those that do not them-
selves cause injury, but may lead people to delay or reject 
proven remedies, possibly worsening their condition.”38 One 
 
 35. See Clinicaltrials.gov, http://www.clinicaltrials.gov (last visited Apr. 13, 
2010).  
 36. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a), (i). 
 37. Compassionate Access Act of 2010, H.R. 4732, 111th Cong. (2010). 
 38. Cancer Care for the New Millennium: Integrative Oncology: Hearing 
Before the H. Comm. on Government Reform, 106th Cong. 76 (2000) (statement 
of Dr. Richard Pazdur, U.S. Food & Drug Admin.), http://frwebgate.access.gpo 
.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=106_house_hearings&docid=f:72932.pdf.  
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FDA site alone identifies 187 current “fake cancer cures.”39 
Desperate cancer patients are easy victims, and the FDA is 
charged by statute with preventing consumer fraud.40  
Epstein discusses both “type I” errors (a product that caus-
es harm) and “type II” errors (the harm caused by the lack of a 
therapy).41 Approval decisions must (and the FDA argues al-
ready do) take into account both issues. Epstein’s discussion of 
the risks of unapproved therapies downplays the problem of in-
effective or fraudulent therapies,42 focusing instead on “legiti-
mate” experimental drugs. Unfortunately, that is not the real 
world, as there are many false or fraudulent cures being 
pushed on patients. His proposal would do little to limit the 
harm caused by these products.  
As is always the case, each policy position, taken to its logi-
cal endpoint, leads to results that are seemingly unacceptable. 
Should the FDA have complete power to make life and death 
access decisions? That seems wrong. Should any patient, no 
matter how vulnerable, have the unfettered right to be duped 
by quacks and also lose the benefit of better therapeutic op-
tions? That also seems wrong.  
B. THE SERIOUS POLICY RISKS INHERENT IN UNFETTERED 
ACCESS 
Epstein’s argument concentrates on the positives of en-
hanced access. He tees up, but does not fully analyze, the theo-
retical or conceptual conflict between the “right to die” and the 
“right to live” or, in his words, the “defensive” versus “offensive” 
view of autonomy.43 More importantly, key countervailing poli-
cy issues are given minimal attention. Unfettered access to ex-
perimental drugs carries substantial risk to individuals and to 
public health.  
1. Protecting the Vulnerable 
Terminally ill patients are at particular risk of being 
preyed upon by the unscrupulous or uninformed. Fraudulent 
 
 39. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 187 Fake Cancer “Cures” Consumers Should 
Avoid, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/ 
EnforcementActivitiesbyFDA/ucm171057.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2010). 
 40. See 21 U.S.C. § 393(b) (2006) (charging the FDA with protecting the 
public health by ensuring that foods are properly labeled, for example).  
 41. See Epstein, supra note 1, at 9. 
 42. See id. at 19–20, 30. 
 43. See id. at 2.  
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cancer cures are a common scam.44 Throughout the FDA’s his-
tory, a key impetus for stricter drug regulation has been the fi-
nancial and medical damage caused by people pushing quack 
remedies or advocating unscientific, ineffective “cures.”  
One need only look at history and at various FDA enforce-
ment actions to confirm the obvious financial risks. Medical 
risks are also real. Certain doctors may have actually believed 
that laetrile was the magic bullet. By pushing laetrile these 
doctors kept patients from other legitimate therapies which 
may have worked and would have added to the universal know-
ledge of cancer. Thus, patients run the very real risk of suffer-
ing substantive physical harm from side effects, not getting any 
benefit, being diverted from more effective therapies, receiving 
false or incomplete information, and suffering substantial eco-
nomic loss.  
Epstein’s proposal leaves these vulnerable populations 
open to greater exploitation in the name of autonomy. One way 
to justify the current system under Epstein’s “liberal” view of 
government regulation would be if the current system does 
provide some meaningful “collateral gain in the quality and 
safety of medical decisions”45 (and I would add economic protec-
tion). Such collateral gain exists, as exemplified by patients 
saved from the harms detailed above. Epstein implicitly recog-
nizes that there are charlatans who will take advantage of ter-
minally ill patients. His view is that strong, after-the-fact en-
forcement is the answer.46 We tried this approach in the pre-
1938 time frame and it proved unacceptable to the American 
people. There is no reason to believe that public opinion has 
changed.  
 
 44. The FDA devotes a portion of its website to warning consumers about 
fraudulent cancer cures. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., BEWARE OF ONLINE CAN-
CER FRAUD 2 (July 17, 2008), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ForConsumers/ 
ConsumerUpdates/UCM143670.pdf. The FDA has taken many enforcement 
actions against entities or individuals pushing fake cures. See, e.g., News Re-
lease, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Warns Individuals and Firms to Stop 
Selling Fake Cancer Cures (June 17, 2008), available at http://www.fda.gov/ 
NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/2008/ucm116913.htm; Letter from 
Susan J. Walker, M.D., Dir., Div. of Dietary Supplement Programs, Office of 
Nutritional Prods. Labeling & Dietary Supplements, Ctr. for Food Safety & 
Applied Nutrition to Michael Kellet, Health-Marketplace.com (Jan. 30, 2006), 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/ 
EnforcementActivitiesbyFDA/CyberLetters/ucm056388.pdf.  
 45. Epstein, supra note 1, at 5. 
 46. Id. at 23–24. 
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One cannot blithely say that patients should have access to 
legitimate experimental therapies but not to nonlegitimate 
therapies. There is no way to universally separate “legitimate” 
experimental products from “quack” experimental products 
without some level of testing and oversight. The breakthrough 
therapy might be strongly questioned by the established medi-
cal profession. This risk of medical orthodoxy squashing inno-
vation remains real. The fundamental purpose of the FDA 
premarket approval process is to separate the legitimate from 
the quackery based on actual evidence. Bypassing the approval 
process defeats this objective and those arguing in favor of eli-
minating the FDA’s premarket role underestimate the risk to 
vulnerable populations.  
2. The Variety of Existing Access Avenues 
It is a misconception that FDA approval acts as an ironclad 
control point with very limited preapproval access. There are a 
variety of general and specific premarket access points in addi-
tion to the formal Phase II and III clinical trials. For example, 
there are premarket “clinical trial” systems such as the indi-
vidual IND,47 emergency use access,48 and the expanded access 
provisions that provide access to drugs during the later stages 
of the clinical testing process.49 There are “orphan drug” provi-
sions with relaxed premarket approval requirements,50 and the 
humanitarian device exemption provisions on the medical de-
vice front.51 In addition, access restrictions are relevant only 
when the drug is not approved for any purpose. Otherwise, 
physicians and patients are free to use the product “off-label” 
for any purpose. Off-label use is widely practiced and provides 
substantial access to drugs for unapproved indications.  
Certain diseases and patient populations may also have 
specific statutory provisions permitting earlier or faster access. 
The “fast track” provision for drugs used for life-threatening 
conditions is one example.52 There are specific accelerated 
access provisions for HIV-related diseases53 and financial in-
 
 47. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb(b) (2006). 
 48. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3(b) (2006 & Supp. 2009) (requiring a declaration 
of a national emergency). 
 49. Id. § 360bbb(c). 
 50. Id. §§ 360aa–360ee. 
 51. Id. § 360j(m). 
 52. 21 U.S.C. § 356 (2006). 
 53. Id. § 300cc-12 to -14. 
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centives and faster approvals for pediatric populations.54 
Clinicaltrials.gov provides patients with information on clinical 
trials of unapproved products in order to improve access.  
In addition, medical tourism developed, in part, to provide 
access to therapies one cannot obtain in the United States. One 
of the earliest public examples of medical tourism was when 
Steve McQueen went to Mexico for eventually unsuccessful 
cancer therapy.55 This trend has continued as evidenced by 
Farrah Fawcett’s trips to Germany for cancer therapy not 
available in the United States.56 Cost is, of course, another po-
tential reason for medical tourism.  
Thus, the drug approval decision point is not some binary 
system with access only postapproval. Many patients (with 
physician oversight and some level of regulatory protection) to-
day do have access to unapproved products. Opening access as 
proposed by Epstein would actually have an impact on many 
fewer patients than may be commonly assumed. The risks of 
his proposal are, unfortunately, not similarly reduced. On the 
macro level, Epstein’s concept has limited benefit and causes 
significantly greater harm. In FDA terms, it has a negative 
risk/benefit ratio.  
3. Unequal Access to Information 
Epstein begins to argue that the individual patient has the 
ability to collect and understand information about various 
treatments and therefore should have the right to make those 
decisions.57 While perhaps romantic, Epstein immediately re-
cognizes that the typical patient does not have the training or 
expertise to understand toxicology, pharmacology, pharmaco-
genetics, oncology, and so on.58 Given this reality, Epstein does 
not finally advocate a pure libertarian approach. Rather, while 
substantially gutting the power and responsibility of the FDA, 
Epstein substitutes the physician and/or professional organiza-
 
 54. 21 U.S.C. §§ 355a, 355c (2006 & Supp. 2009). 
 55. Barron H. Lerner, McQueen’s Legacy of Laetrile, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 
2005, at F5. Note that Mr. McQueen was relying on the advice of a dentist for 
his decision to go to Mexico for an “unconventional” treatment. Id. 
 56. Miranda Hitti, Farrah Fawcett’s German Cancer Care, WEBMD 
HEALTH NEWS, May 15, 2009, http://www.webmd.com/cancer/news/20090515/ 
farrah-fawcetts-german-cancer-care. Cost is the other driving factor behind 
medical tourism.  
 57. Epstein, supra note 1, at 3. 
 58. See id. at 3. 
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tions as the key access control system.59 He accepts some man-
datory preaccess FDA testing and the validity of the prescrip-
tion drug system—controlled by the physician—as a limit on 
patient autonomy. In essence, he accepts the need for a control 
mechanism between the patient and access to a therapeutic 
drug.  
This substitution of physicians and professional organiza-
tions for the role of the FDA60 is the linchpin of Epstein’s ar-
gument. As he states, “The key conclusion is that voluntary 
current mechanisms . . . are far more likely to work across the 
board [than the FDA].”61 This would depend upon the voluntary 
group doing at least as well or even better than the FDA in as-
sembling and analyzing data on product efficacy, uses, and ul-
timate product value. Epstein clearly believes that the FDA is 
“second-best” at this task.62 If this assumption is inaccurate, as 
seems to be the case, then Epstein’s approach fails by its own 
terms.  
When examined in detail, Epstein’s argument depends 
upon the reality that the physician has greater knowledge of 
the specific patient, and the erroneous assumption that the 
physician and professional organization has equal or greater 
access to information and expertise than the FDA, and greater 
ability to effectively analyze such information. Epstein’s argu-
ment also assumes that the physician has no conflicts of inter-
est. As further detailed below in Part IV.B., it is impossible for 
any physician (or professional organization) to have greater 
access to information than the FDA, which has access to more 
information from a wider variety of sources than any profes-
sional organization and thus is better positioned to make gen-
eral risk/benefit assessments.  
4. The FDA Process Provides More Transparency and 
Advances Public Input  
Individual physician decisions occur in a more private, less 
transparent, and less accountable fashion than FDA decisions. 
Whether one likes them or not, FDA decisions are public and 
 
 59. Even today, the physician functions as a gatekeeper. Essentially, all 
oncology drugs are prescription drugs and thus require physician approval for 
use even if the patient otherwise wants the drug. See 21 U.S.C. § 353(b) 
(2006). 
 60. Epstein, supra note 1, at 41. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See id.  
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are subject to some level of recourse through the democratic po-
litical process. The “fast track” provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 356 
are, after all, mostly a response to political advocacy and pres-
sure. Removing the FDA from the equation and transferring its 
role to physicians and organizations reduces the level of demo-
cratic oversight and accountability. Can patients force a medi-
cal association to change a practice guideline or policy? They 
cannot. Can patients petition the FDA or Congress for change? 
They can.63 
The physician often has financial, professional, or other in-
terests that are not aligned with the patient’s interests. The de-
cision to use chemotherapy rather than radiation has a finan-
cial impact as different medical specialties are responsible for 
the different therapeutic approaches. 
Responsibility for policy decisions regarding access to new 
drugs should be vested in the system or structure with the 
greatest transparency, public input, and accountability—and 
that is the FDA.  
5. The Public Is Affected by Individual Access Decisions 
Epstein’s libertarian approach is based on the premise that 
the patient’s decision essentially affects only the patient. As 
such, the government should have little interest in such deci-
sions. Yet that is not reality. First, therapeutic decisions by a 
patient often do affect the broader public, as the public is often 
involved in paying for therapies. In addition, if a therapy fails 
to cure a disease or causes some adverse event, the public pays 
the cost of ongoing care.  
Second, some of those advocating government controls over 
access to experimental drugs argue that allowing patients 
access to an experimental drug reduces the ability to get sub-
jects to participate in formal clinical trials. The argument runs: 
why join a clinical trial and have a fifty percent chance of get-
ting the drug you want when you have a one-hundred percent 
chance of having the drug you want by simply getting your doc-
tor to prescribe it? By allowing freer access, it will take more 
time and money before the FDA can approve (or certify under 
Epstein’s construct) the new drug. 
 
 63. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(t) (2006) (mandating the reimbursement of 
certain drugs used for cancer patients even if that particular use of the drug is 
not approved by the FDA); 42 U.S.C. § 300cc-12 (2006) (mandating expanded 
access to HIV drugs). 
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Given that the public is directly and indirectly affected by 
access decisions, the public should have some level of involve-
ment in generalized access decisions (in contrast to patient-
specific medical decisions). The current system provides for 
public input in balance with patient autonomy. 
6. The Phase I Myth 
Epstein, like the Abigail Alliance, argues that it is accepta-
ble for the FDA to act as a safety gatekeeper through the Phase 
I clinical trial step.64 The argument runs that the FDA does 
play a legitimate role in determining safety during Phase I clin-
ical trials, and the public should have access to products that 
have successfully completed Phase I testing. This argument ig-
nores the real meaning of Phase I clinical trials and misunders-
tands the concept of “safety” in real-life drug approvals. 
First, Phase I clinical studies do not establish that a prod-
uct is safe. Rather, they are an initial step to determine wheth-
er there is enough safety data to proceed. Phase I studies are 
incapable of making a final or conclusive safety determination 
because of (1) the small size of the studies (generally less than 
100 subjects), (2) the nature of the subject (healthy volunteers), 
and (3) low dosing. Other than the most frank safety problem, a 
study of 80–100 subjects does not have the statistical power to 
identify real-life safety issues. 
Also remember that, in real life, “safety” is a function of the 
disease and the benefit. Every drug has a side effect. Whether a 
drug is safe enough to use in a particular situation depends 
upon the nature of the disease, the benefit of the product, 
available options, and so on. None of this information is gener-
ated during the typical Phase I study. 
Logically, if the FDA is to have a role in keeping unsafe 
products off the market, is there any reason why it should not 
play a similar role in keeping ineffective products off the mar-
ket? The only possible answer is that unsafe products pose the 
risk of hurting people, while ineffective products do not pose 
the same risk. However, all drugs have risks for individual pa-
tients. Moreover, using an ineffective product often deprives 
the patient of the value of a more efficacious product. 
Even Epstein balks at taking personal autonomy to the log-
ical end of eliminating the FDA’s gatekeeping role for safety. 
The question is then not whether the FDA should have a role in 
 
 64. Epstein, supra note 1, at 20. 
  
66 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW HEADNOTES [94:50 
 
drug approval, but rather the nature of the role. There is no va-
lid policy reason to permit FDA oversight of “safety” and then 
go the other direction regarding “efficacy” decisions. The two 
concepts are inexorably intertwined. Past efforts in the 1938–
1962 timeframe to make this artificial distinction failed.  
C. THE OFF-LABEL CONUNDRUM 
The reality of off-label use presents additional conceptual 
challenges. In all probability, each of us has used off-label 
products.65 Some estimate that seventy percent of all pediatric 
prescriptions are off-label. Perhaps twenty percent of all pre-
scriptions are off-label.66  
If one argues that the FDA approval process must be in 
place to protect patients from unapproved products, why, then, 
is off-label use perfectly legal? The FDA does not regulate the 
practice of medicine and by statute physicians are free to use 
an approved product for any unapproved use.67 The availability 
of off-label use thus undercuts much of the need for Epstein’s 
proposal. The FDA acts as a true gatekeeper only for the first 
approval of the drug in question for any purpose. After that 
point, the FDA acts much more as the certifying entity envi-
sioned by Epstein.  
Importantly, risks are reduced in off-label use following an 
initial approval for an unrelated use. First, basic toxicology and 
safety data has been developed during the approval of the first 
use. While different indications can present different toxicity 
and safety issues, there is a substantial body of basic scientific 
and clinical information available. Second, physicians often 
have more information about the drug for the off-label use giv-
en its other, on-label uses. Dosing information, metabolic data, 
drug interactions, basic pharmacology, mutagenicity informa-
tion, and so on may be applicable across drug uses. Finally, the 
FDA has determined, in at least some cases, that the product 
has a positive risk/benefit ratio. So we have some level of confi-
dence that the product is not total quackery. 
 
 65. In this context, off-label simply means being used for a purpose other 
than as indicated on the FDA approved labeling. Remember that the FDA ap-
proves specific uses of drugs and not the drug itself.  
 66. See Ralph F. Hall & Robert J. Berlin, When You Have a Hammer Eve-
rything Looks Like a Nail: Misapplication of the False Claims Act to Off-Label 
Promotion, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 653, 657–59 (2006) (describing some of the 
legal aspects of off-label uses). 
 67. 21 U.S.C. § 396 (2006). 
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So how can we deal with this paradox? We can go down 
Epstein’s road and open up all uses after basic safety data is 
collected. (However, remember that safety is usually not an ab-
stract question, but is intertwined with efficacy, dosage, and so 
on.) One could, as Epstein suggests, move the FDA from a regu-
latory gatekeeper to an information source or certifying entity. 
Another option is to make any use of a product for an off-
label purpose illegal. Such an approach certainly impinges pa-
tient autonomy and the perceived physician role. Such philo-
sophical purity would probably flounder on the rocks of medical 
need and patient/physician desires. States generally regulate 
the practice of medicine and also could, on a state-by-state ba-
sis, prohibit some or all off-label uses. For example, Ohio has 
banned the use of Plan B products for off-label uses and that 
ban was upheld by the Ohio Supreme Court.68 Such bans are 
exceedingly rare and in this case involve a highly politicized 
drug.  
There are no totally satisfying answers to the conundrum 
posed by off-label use. The current approach to off-label use 
strikes a policy balance that is not philosophically pure but re-
flects the difficulty of these issues and the need for some prac-
tical balance.  
D. SO WHERE DOES THAT LEAVE THE POLICY DEBATE? 
As must be clear, there is no one “right answer” to where 
the line should be drawn between patient autonomy and the 
protection of overall public health and the prevention of fraud. 
As shown above, Congress and other policymakers continue the 
long struggle to define the balance. Epstein recognizes this re-
ality and calls this issue “[o]ne of the thorniest questions in le-
gal analysis.”69  
In many senses, this issue is a so-called wicked problem. “A 
‘wicked’ problem has innumerable causes, is tough to describe, 
and doesn’t have a right answer . . . .”70 They “occur in a social 
context; the greater the disagreement among stakeholders, the 
more wicked the problem. In fact, it’s the social complexity of 
 
 68. Cordray v. Planned Parenthood, 911 N.E.2d 871, 879 (2009). 
 69. Epstein, supra note 1, at 1. 
 70. John C. Camillus, Strategy as a Wicked Problem, 86 HARV. BUS. REV. 
98, 100 (May 2008). The concept of “wicked” problems can be traced to the 
work of Rittel and Webber in the 1970s while at the University of California, 
Berkeley. See generally Horst W.J. Rittel & Melvin M. Webber, Dilemmas in a 
General Theory of Planning, 4 POL’Y SCI. 155 (1973). 
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wicked problems as much as their technical difficulties that 
make them tough to manage.”71  
We can and should continue the debate in order to properly 
strike the balance between patient autonomy and patient pro-
tection even if the odds of agreement or consensus are minimal. 
Often, one’s view depends on one’s perspective. If I am the can-
cer patient, I know the answer. Likewise, if I am seeing the af-
termath of some medical quackery foisted off on a vulnerable 
relative, I know a (different) answer. The balance between pa-
tient autonomy and protection is subjective and ever-changing.  
The competing policy issues inherent in this debate render 
extreme answers on either side of the conundrum questionable. 
There is a need for a centralist position that seeks to balance 
the differing needs. Taking an extreme or “purist” position as 
Epstein does undervalues the countervailing policy concerns 
and needs.  
The fact that the issues are so complex makes more impor-
tant the actual history and impact of various proposals. Rather 
than debating the esoteric aspects of this issue, we can and 
should look to real events. History illustrates the actual im-
pact—good or bad—of various policy options and thus allows for 
a more accurate, data rich discussion of possible answers to 
this “wicked problem.” 
III.  THE PAST AS PROLOGUE   
Rather than getting trapped in a philosophical debate, I in-
stead turn to the practical and the lessons of history. We can 
assess rather accurately via history whether Epstein’s proposal 
would work and its likely impact on public health by examining 
past regulatory schemas and practices. We can and should ask 
whether the system worked when professional organizations 
have played the key gatekeeping role in lieu of a strong pre-
market approval system for drugs. History answers this ques-
tion with a strong “no.” There have been major issues when 
professional medical organizations, personal physicians, and 
individual patients have unfettered access to any drug they 
want or see on TV.  
 
 71. Camillus, supra note 70, at 100.  
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A. 1938–1962 AND THE DESI PROCESS  
One of the best tests of Epstein’s proposed approach oc-
curred during the 1938–1962 time frame.72 In 1938, Congress 
replaced the 1906 Pure Food and Drug Act with the first ver-
sion of the current Food Drug and Cosmetic Act. The 1906 Act 
had no premarket review or approval process for drugs. There 
was no prescription drug system requiring physician interven-
tion. The premarket review system was created in 1938 follow-
ing the sulfanilamide tragedy.73 Congress and the public con-
cluded that some level of government oversight was needed 
prior to a new drug hitting the market.  
At this time, the FDA reviewed drug safety but didn’t as-
sess product efficacy,74 which was left to the medical communi-
ty (much as Epstein advocates). Physicians and medical socie-
ties had free rein to decide what products worked and when to 
use them. The role of the physician and voluntary medical so-
ciety as the primary gatekeepers was further enhanced in 1950 
when Congress formalized the prescription drug system. Pa-
tients had no stand-alone access to any drug, thus limiting pa-
tient autonomy.  
This structure lasted until 1962 when, as a result of the 
thalidomide tragedy75 and other public pressures, Congress re-
quired products to be efficacious as well as safe before market-
ing. Congress also required drugs approved from 1938–1962 to 
be reassessed for efficacy.76 This established that the medical 
community (and manufacturers) had been using and marketing 
a substantial number of products without any meaningful data 
 
 72. Prior to the 1920s, almost all drugs were natural products or extracts 
of naturally occurring plants or other material. As such, other than to remind 
everyone of the scope and number of quack remedies and snake oil salesmen, 
the differences in the state of pharmaceutical science renders the pre-1906 pe-
riod of minimal practical value. 
 73. See supra notes 25–28 and accompanying text. 
 74. Regulation of the medical device world lagged behind the drug world. 
The major device regulatory system did not come into existence until 1976. 
The later timeframe for medical devices is probably due to both the variability 
in risk of medical devices and major technology advances in the 1960s and ear-
ly 1970s coupled with several very public device issues—primarily the Dalkon 
Shield and Shiley Heart Valve. Given this timing difference, I will focus on the 
drug regulatory system.  
 75. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 76. The provisions of the Kefauver-Harris Drug Amendments or the Drug 
Amendments of 1962 are now codified in 21 U.S.C. § 355 and implementing 
regulations. When the 1938 Act passed, Congress grandfathered in “old drugs” 
(see the definition of “new drug” in 21 U.S.C. § 321(p) (2006)). In contrast, in 
1962 Congress required the 1938–1962 drugs to meet the new 1962 standards. 
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that the products worked; in many cases they in fact did not 
work. Without a federal regulatory oversight schema, the medi-
cal profession, including voluntary professional societies, had 
not separated the wheat from the chaff. There are a number of 
possible reasons for this failing: lack of data, lack of data 
access, or data being ignored. Whatever the reason, in 1962 
Congress decided that the FDA had to step in and assume the 
gatekeeper role for assessing product efficacy.  
The details of this reinforce the medical community’s fail-
ure to fulfill its role as efficacy determiners. To accomplish the 
statutory task of determining efficacy for 1938–1962 drugs, the 
FDA commissioned the DESI study (Drug Efficacy Study Im-
plementation), also referred to as the NAS/NRC (National 
Academy of Science/National Research Council) study. This 
major effort analyzed approximately 16,500 efficacy claims for 
about 4,000 products.77 The results undercut the belief that 
physicians or the medical community in general can either de-
termine drug efficacy or adopt practice approaches that reject 
inefficacious drugs.  
In its key report,78 the DESI study used five categories for 
efficacy claims made regarding specific drug products.79 As can 
be seen in the following table, the number of products with 







 77. The Drug Efficacy Study of the National Research Council’s Division 
of Medical Sciences, 1966–1969, http://www7.nationalacademies.org/archives/ 
drugefficacy.html#P177_8632 (last visited May 11, 2010); see also Note, Drug 
Efficacy and the 1962 Drug Amendments, 60 GEO. L.J. 185, 207–12 (1971).  
 78. While the main report was issued in 1969, a number of drugs re-
mained unanalyzed for many years. The 1969 study assessed, in general, the 
most important products. 
 79. The categories and their short definitions are as follows: 
Effective—Self-explanatory and evidence-based. 
Probably effective—Additional evidence required to determine efficacy. 
Possibly effective—Little evidence of effectiveness, but possibility of additional 
evidence should not be ruled out. 
Ineffective—No acceptable evidence to support claim. 
Effective, but—Effective for claimed indication (use) but not approved form of 
treatment because better, safer, or more conveniently administered drugs are 
available. 
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Rating Number of Claims % of Claims 
Ineffective 2442 14.7 
Possibly Effective 5778 34.9 
Probably Effective 1204 7.3 
Effective 3159 19.1 
Effective, but 3990 24.0 
Total 16,573 100 
 
Essentially, fifty percent of indications for use had little or 
no evidence to support the efficacy of the claimed use. Despite 
this glaring gap in evidence or actual negative scientific data, 
physicians were using these products routinely. In this almost 
quarter-century experiment, the medical community did not, of 
its own accord, develop and utilize robust efficacy data. Why 
should we think today that the medical community would act 
differently? 
The DESI study forces one to seriously question the ability 
or will of the medical profession—absent regulatory oversight—
to assess product efficacy or to generally conform medical prac-
tice to best practices. If we return to the pre-1962 system as 
Epstein suggests, can we expect a different outcome today? 
B. COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS ISSUES CONFIRM THE 
PROBLEM WITH RELYING ON VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS 
One can of course argue that the problems found through 
the DESI study were a long time ago, that the medical commu-
nity has changed, or that we have new capabilities that render 
history uninstructive—Santayana’s famous warning to the con-
trary.80 After all, today we have more doctors, more specializa-
tion, more research, globalization, and a quantum leap in in-
formation technology. All of this could lead one to conclude that 
today’s doctors and today’s medical professional organizations 
are substantively different from their predecessors and have 
developed strong efficacy data to support their treatment deci-
sions. To reach this conclusion, however, one would also have to 
conclude that the increased time and financial pressures facing 
physicians and the explosion in medical complexity and infor-
mation sources have not negatively impacted the ability or wil-
lingness of the medical community to conduct these assess-
 
 80. GEORGE SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON: OR THE PHASES OF HU-
MAN PROGRESS 82 (1953) (“Those who cannot remember the past are con-
demned to repeat it.”). 
  
72 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW HEADNOTES [94:50 
 
ments. Unfortunately, the reality is that physicians often lack 
the information that Epstein requires of them. The current fo-
cus on comparative effectiveness demonstrates that the medical 
profession individually and collectively has not met the obliga-
tion that Epstein’s proposal requires and demands. The expert 
consensus from many perspectives is that in too many cases we 
don’t have adequate data on which drug or therapy is better for 
a specific disease.81 Shouldn’t physicians know which drugs or 
therapies work best and then use those superior therapies? 
While logic clearly says “yes,” the reality is that this is not a 
routine occurrence in today’s medical environment.  
A problematic foundation of Epstein’s approach is thus 
that the medical community and professional societies can do a 
better job than the FDA in assessing all available evidence 
about a particular therapy and making efficacy determinations. 
Comparative effectiveness is the fancy term for looking at two 
or more therapies for a specific disease or condition and decid-
ing which is best, which is what Epstein envisions the medical 
community itself providing. But current data on the extent of 
the gaps in comparative effectiveness data and in the use of ex-
isting data argues that any such transfer of responsibility may 
be fraught with peril. 
The FDA, further, has not felt that it is authorized by sta-
tute to use comparative effectiveness in approval decisions. The 
approval standards in 21 U.S.C. § 355(c) and (d) require the 
FDA to review the drug on the basis of the intended labeling 
and use of the product. In testimony leading up to the 1962 
amendments, an agency representative stated, “[w]e do not 
seek the authority [and] . . . we would not and do not want to 
 
 81. There are numerous such conclusions. See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OF-
FICE, RESEARCH ON THE COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS OF MEDICAL TREAT-
MENTS: ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR AN EXPANDED FEDERAL ROLE (2007), availa-
ble at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/88xx/doc8891/12-18-ComparativeEffectiveness 
.pdf; Initial National Priorities for Comparative Effectiveness Research, INST. OF 
MED., June 2009, available at http://www.iom.edu/Reports/2009/Comparative 
EffectivenessResearchPriorities.aspx [hereinafter National Priorities]; Michael 
Hochman & Danny McCormick, Characteristics of Published Comparative Ef-
fectiveness Studies of Medications, 303 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 951 (2010); Alvin I. 
Mushlin & Hassan Ghomrawi, Health Care Reform and the Need for Compar-
ative-Effectiveness Research, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. e6 (2010); Peter J. Neu-
mann & Sean R. Tunis, Medicare and Medical Technology—The Growing De-
mand for Relevant Outcomes, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 377 (2010). 
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pass on relative efficacy.”82 The medical community, not the 
FDA, was essentially charged with determining which therapy 
or drug was better than another once the FDA had fulfilled its 
initial gatekeeping role of assuring that the drug was safe and 
efficacious for its labeled or intended purpose. Unfortunately, 
as discussed in more detail below, the medical community has 
not fulfilled this role in any way near the extent now desired. 
This significant gap is confirmed by the major push in this 
country (and others) by policymakers, regulators, the medical 
profession, payors, and others for substantially enhanced com-
parative effectiveness research, data, and utilization. This ef-
fort starts with the conclusion that current medical practition-
ers too often do not know or utilize the best therapeutic 
approach. It postulates that the medical community has not, as 
Epstein would require, developed or adopted evidence-based 
approaches to health care decisions (even in situations absent 
FDA oversight).  
No existing laws or regulations prohibit or restrict the 
medical profession from assessing product efficacy and safety or 
determining best practices and practice guidelines. If the medi-
cal community currently does not do so or goes so far as to use 
nonevidence based practice guidelines, then one should serious-
ly question turning over the FDA’s regulatory oversight to 
these groups.  
The need for substantially enhanced comparative effec-
tiveness data has been established by the medical community, 
Congress, the Congressional Budget Office, the Institute of 
Medicine, and payors, including the federal government and 
patients.83 This commentary is not the place for an exhaustive 
discussion of the need for comparative effectiveness. However, 
a few examples prove that voluntary medical associations have 
failed to assemble, disseminate, or follow best practices when 
deciding which treatment to use for a specific disease. 
In 2007, the Congressional Budget Office stated that “hard 
evidence is often unavailable about which treatments work best 
for which patients.”84 The CBO report goes on to outline signifi-
 
 82. Hearings Before the Senate Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of 
the Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong. 2585, 2605 (1961) (statement of Secre-
tary Ribicoff ). 
 83. See supra note 81. 
 84. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, RESEARCH ON THE COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVE-
NESS OF MEDICAL TREATMENTS: ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR AN EXPANDED FED-
ERAL ROLE 1 (2007), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/88xx/doc8891/12 
-18-ComparativeEffectiveness.pdf. 
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cant variations in treatments utilized in different geographic 
areas of the United States.85 The best medical treatment for the 
same cancer doesn’t differ between parts of the country. Re-
gional variations are attributed to a lack of good data, payment 
pressures, historical practices, and the level of compliance with 
existing practice guidelines. 
In its report, the CBO directly addressed the question of 
whether private, nongovernmental entities, including payors, 
will or should be expected to conduct comparative effectiveness 
research. After discussing some current but limited private 
comparative effectiveness, CBO went on to state: “Notwith-
standing those current efforts, the private sector generally will 
not produce as much research on comparative effectiveness as 
society would value. The knowledge created by such studies is 
costly to produce—but once it is produced, it can be dissemi-
nated at essentially no additional cost . . . .”86 The CBO’s con-
clusion that private efforts cannot fill the need for comparative 
effectiveness strikes directly at the heart of Epstein’s argu-
ment. In order to continue down his road, one must conclude 
either that the CBO and others are wrong or that the voluntary 
medical organizations and other stakeholders will suddenly 
change their ways when presented with this new opportunity. 
Neither seems likely.  
The CBO report is not alone. In early 2009, as part of the 
economic stimulus program, Congress allocated $1.1 billion, 
spread among several government entities, for comparative ef-
fectiveness research.87 Even Congress doesn’t spend that 
amount of money unless there is some perceived need. As a 
part of this spending, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) con-
ducted a detailed assessment of comparative effectiveness 
needs and priorities. IOM findings are, to be blunt, scary if one 
wants to rely on the medical establishment as proposed by Eps-
tein. The IOM report states: 
 
• Nationally “less than half of all treatments delivered 
today are supported by evidence.”88  
 
 85. Id. at 12–15. 
 86. Id. at 8. 
 87. Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hu-
man Servs., AHRQ and the Recovery Act, http://www.ahrq.gov/fund/cefarra.htm 
(last visited Apr. 24, 2010). 
 88. National Priorities, supra note 81, at 30.  
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• Relatively few practice guidelines from the American 
College of Cardiology are based on “high-quality evi-
dence.”89 
• “[T]wo-thirds of recommendations contained in 51 
guidelines for treating lung cancer were not evidence-
based.”90 
• Even when guidelines exist, they are often not followed. 
Patients in the United States may receive only 55% of 
the recommended care.91 
• Only 46.5% of children and youth received the recom-
mended care.92 
 
The IOM has clearly found major gaps both in the identifi-
cation and development of valid practice guidelines and in the 
actual use of practice guidelines by the physician community. 
Both of these factors must, however, be true for Epstein’s con-
struct to work.  
The medical community itself recognizes the need for com-
parative effectiveness, as well as the fact that it has not done 
nearly enough to develop such data in the past and has not had 
enough effect on medical practices.93 
History, starting with the DESI studies and continuing up 
to today’s efforts to remedy the lack of robust comparative ef-
fectiveness data, casts serious doubt on the foundational as-
sumption underlying Epstein’s position that physicians and 
medical societies will develop and utilize drug efficacy data bet-
ter than the FDA. 
IV.  THE VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATION CHALLENGE   
Epstein asserts that professional associations are better 
equipped or more capable of generating robust efficacy data 
and acting on that data in making medical choices. While pa-
 
 89. Id.; see also Pierluigi Tricoci et al., Scientific Evidence Underlying the 
ACC/AHA Clinical Practice Guidelines, 301 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 831 (2009). 
 90. National Priorities, supra note 81, at 30; see also Linda H. Harpole et 
al., Assessment of the Scope and Quality of Clinical Practice Guidelines in 
Lung Cancer, 123 CHEST (Supp.) 7S (2003). 
 91. National Priorities, supra note 81, at 32–33; see also Elizabeth A. 
McGlynn et al., The Quality of Health Care Delivered to Adults in the United 
States, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2635 (2003). 
 92. National Priorities, supra note 81, at 33; see also Rita Mangione-
Smith et al., The Quality of Ambulatory Care Delivered to Children in the 
United States, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1515 (2007). 
 93. See supra note 81. 
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tients are the ultimate decision makers, even Epstein recogniz-
es that the average patient does not have the training, exper-
tise, or background to dissect and understand complex medical 
information.94 Unfortunately, history and a close examination 
of the structure and capacity of voluntary professional organi-
zations undercut this assumption. The inescapable conclusion 
is that the FDA is in a substantially better position than any 
voluntary professional association to collect and analyze data 
from multiple sources. 
Remember that both Epstein and I are concentrating on 
the structural or statutory issues surrounding agency and pro-
fessional society power and authority. Whether the agency or 
any one professional society is actually effective in exercising 
these powers is a different question. Epstein is spot on with his 
view that structural issues or performance need to be ad-
dressed at the policy level by Congress. Performance issues 
should be addressed by management changes, resource in-
creases, or operational changes. This latter set of issues is out-
side the scope of this debate. 
A. VOLUNTARY PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS HAVE A POOR 
HISTORY OF GENERATING ROBUST OR PERHAPS EVEN VALID 
PRACTICE GUIDELINES 
As discussed earlier, medical associations today are com-
pletely free to develop and implement practice guidelines. As 
has been established by the current need for comparative effec-
tiveness data, medical associations have not fulfilled this need.  
There are many reasons for this. Medical associations lack 
the structure and organization to do the research and analyze 
the results. Remember, these are voluntary organizations. As 
detailed below, they have incomplete access to information. In 
addition, medical associations are generally silos of specific 
specialties. There are, for example, a number of relevant but 
individual medical associations within the oncology field, each 
with its own area of specialized knowledge. There are surgical 
associations, chemotherapy-centric groups, and radiation spe-
cialty groups. Determining the best therapy may require as-
sessing therapeutic options across all specialties. It is difficult, 
if not impossible, for the medical community consistently to 
have cross-cutting, cross-disciplinary groups that have the re-
levant expertise in all subspecialties. Individual professional 
 
 94. Epstein, supra note 1, at 3–4. 
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medical groups may also lack expertise in basic science areas 
such as pharmacokinetics, toxicology, and pharmacogenetics.  
There is simply no way to compel a voluntary medical as-
sociation to research or assess any new therapy or to create, 
reassess, or modify any practice guideline. Individual physi-
cians likewise struggle to keep current with all medical devel-
opments and generally lack the time, resources, facilities or ex-
pertise to conduct statistically valid research. One can find 
exceptions, but asking voluntary medical associations to as-
sume the gatekeeper function is asking them to do more than 
should be expected. They are not government agencies and 
should not be treated as such.  
B. THE FDA HAS BETTER AND FASTER DATA ACCESS 
Robust efficacy determinations or the development of valid 
practice guidelines require access to complete and current data. 
Logically, the entity with the best access to data is best posi-
tioned to make efficacy determinations. The FDA definitionally 
has superior data access compared to private medical associa-
tions. Several examples demonstrate this fact.  
First, except for some individual medical records,95 there is 
no data that a medical professional can access that the FDA 
cannot. That alone says that the FDA is at least on equal foot-
ing with medical associations and doctors. In actuality, the 
FDA has superior data access from a number of sources. 
Companies (and to a much more limited extent, health care 
providers) are required to provide complete internal and exter-
nal scientific information to the FDA as part of the application 
process and ongoing reporting obligations.96 The FDA has the 
statutory authority to inspect companies and to inspect clinical 
trial sites and clinical data.97 Clinical trial information on new 
products is submitted to the FDA and a subset of that informa-
 
 95. Even with regard to personal medical records, the government can 
access millions of records through the Medicare/Medicaid systems and through 
other military and nonmilitary employee health care systems. These data sets 
are generally more than ample for any data searches or retrospective case con-
trol studies. 
 96. See 21 C.F.R. § 314 (2009) and 21 C.F.R. § 814 (2009) for examples of 
regulatory obligations on companies to submit complete data sets (and to pe-
riodically update the data set) with both public (published) information and 
confidential information during both the approval process and as part of ongo-
ing reporting requirements. 
 97. 21 U.S.C. §§ 360j(c), 374 (2006); 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.58, 312.68, 812.145. 
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tion is posted on a publicly accessible website.98 A voluntary or-
ganization cannot require such submissions, have complete 
access to all of the information available to the FDA, inspect 
clinical trial sites, or conduct regulatory inspections.  
Moreover, companies are required to promptly submit case 
reports (confirmed and unconfirmed) about deaths, serious in-
juries, or “near misses” involving their products.99 No voluntary 
professional society can (1) require such submissions, (2) un-
cover missing data during inspections, or (3) obtain such infor-
mation from multiple sources in a timely fashion. These reports 
can serve as important data or indicators of product issues. 
Further, only a government regulatory agency can impose test-
ing obligations, postmarket programs such as Risk Evaluation 
and Mitigation Strategies (REMS), or product tracking sys-
tems.  
The FDA can also access information from submissions or 
reports from multiple companies. Generally speaking, certain 
detailed data included in approval submissions of various 
types100 are trade secrets and therefore confidential.101 The 
FDA, however, has access to such information and is clearly 
authorized to use confidential data from one submission to as-
sess the safety and efficacy of another product.102 Private 
groups do not have such rights and would struggle to have 
prompt access to such confidential information. Unless the vo-
luntary association is somehow deputized with governmental 
powers to demand data, compel compliance, conduct inspec-
tions, and guarantee confidentiality (a concept fraught with po-
litical, practical, and legal barriers), only the FDA will have 
complete data access. 
Furthermore, the FDA also has access to information from 
other regulatory agencies, both U.S. and non-U.S. Various go-
vernmental agencies can and do exchange information with the 
 
 98. See U.S. National Institutes of Health, ClinicalTrials.gov, http://www 
.clinicaltrials.gov (last visited Apr. 24, 2010).  
 99. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.80 for adverse drug reporting requirements (gen-
erally referred to as ADRs) and 21 C.F.R. § 803 for device adverse event re-
porting obligations (generally referred to as MDRs). 
 100. Examples of such submissions include New Drug Applications 
(NDAs), Investigational Drug Applications (INDs), Premarket Approvals 
(PMAs), Investigational Device Exemptions (IDEs) and Biological License Ap-
plications (BLAs). 
 101. 21 U.S.C. § 379; 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.430, 814.9. 
 102. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) and (e) clearly contemplate that the FDA can use 
data from any source in making approval or withdrawal decisions. 
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FDA regarding scientific developments, new research, product 
information, medical issues, and so on via a number of mechan-
isms, including statutory requirements and interagency memo-
randa of understanding. Via these processes, the FDA can ob-
tain data from the Center for Medicaid and Medicare Services 
(CMS), other parts of HHS such as the Office of the Inspector 
General, Agency for Health Research and Quality (AHRQ), the 
Department of Justice (and various U.S. Attorney offices), the 
FTC, and the SEC.103 The FDA can also access information 
from individual states. Such data can be used prospectively to 
identify best practices, to obtain information from inspections 
or enforcement actions, or to identify efficacy or safety issues. A 
private, voluntary entity is greatly hampered in accessing such 
information.  
On the international front, the FDA has established infor-
mation exchanges with a significant number of foreign regula-
tory agencies.104 This provides the FDA with access to even 
more data and the ability to work with these counterpart agen-
cies to develop product usage information or recommendations 
and to identify safety and/or efficacy issues.  
If one believes that robust data is a sine qua non to deter-
mining best practices, safety, efficacy, product risks, or any 
similar determination, then the responsibility for such deter-
minations should primarily rest on the entity with the best 
access to the greatest quantity and quality of data. The FDA, 
not a voluntary professional organization, has this access. One 
is hard pressed to identify any significant data source that a 
private professional society could access that the FDA could 
not.105 Data availability alone points towards the FDA, not 
some private group, having the key role in product approvals. 
 
 103. See, e.g., 36 Fed. Reg. 18,503, 18,539 (Sept. 16, 1971). 
 104. See U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Memoranda of Understanding and 
Other Cooperative Arrangements, http://www.fda.gov/InternationalPrograms/ 
Agreements/MemorandaofUnderstanding/default.htm (last visited May 11, 
2010) (providing an exhaustive list of such arrangements across a wide variety 
of substantive areas). 
 105. Remember that the FDA has the ability to convene expert panels to 
provide input to the FDA on complex scientific and medical questions. This is 
commonly done for complex approval decisions or controversial product deci-
sions. These advisory groups are regulated by the Federal Advisory Committee 
Act (FACA), 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1–16 (2006). These requirements include trans-
parency and conflict of interest provisions. 
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C. THE FDA HAS SUPERIOR RESOURCES AND ACCESS TO 
EXPERTISE  
Collecting, analyzing, deciding, and monitoring efficacy in-
formation and practice guidelines are resource-intensive activi-
ties. Studies and data analysis simply cost a lot of money. For 
example, Congress has appropriated $1.1 billion for compara-
tive effectiveness studies, with more money needed.106 Individ-
ual physicians and professional societies simply cannot match 
these resources—one simple study on just one use of one par-
ticular medical device will take three years and cost $3.5 mil-
lion. Unless we are comfortable with efficacy decisions and 
practice guidelines being developed from anecdote and guess-
timates, substantial time and money is required.  
The sources of such resources are few. The FDA can do it 
using general revenue funds and user fees, product sponsors 
can on occasion fund such research as part of the cost of an ap-
proval (and pass some or all of the cost on to consumers), 
payors can fund it (and pass some or all of the cost on to con-
sumers), or voluntary associations can attempt to fund such re-
search—with no viable funding mechanism or ability to pass 
the costs to consumers, industry, or the government. Profes-
sional societies have access to their members and perhaps an-
cillary support from other volunteers, professional societies, 
private foundations, and perhaps from home institutions. This 
support, however, is at best ad hoc.  
In addition to financial resources, as discussed earlier, the 
FDA can leverage scientific and medical expertise from across 
the government and can reach out to nongovernment experts 
via the advisory panel process. The FDA has access to whatever 
information the medical community possesses through formal 
and informal means. Private medical associations can never 
hope to match the FDA’s resources or access to information and 
expertise. This critical factor alone undercuts the ability of pro-
fessional societies to fulfill this need and reinforces that the 
FDA is in a better position to fulfill this responsibility on an 
ongoing basis. 
 
 106. Press Release, The National Academies, Institute of Medicine Report 
Recommends 100 Initial Priorities for Research to Determine Which Health 
Care Approaches Work Best (June 30, 2009), available at http://www8 
.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/newsitem.aspx?RecordID=12468. 
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D. VOLUNTARY PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS FACE CONFLICT 
OF INTEREST ISSUES 
Voluntary professional organizations also face a number of 
conflict of interest issues. Physicians are compensated based on 
therapies utilized and interventions employed. A surgical pro-
cedure may result in a larger payment to the physician than 
simply prescribing a drug. Each subspecialty has a financial 
and professional incentive to boost utilization of its therapeutic 
approaches. Overutilization of specific therapies is something 
that constantly worries payors and is one of the driving factors 
behind the push for comparative effectiveness. Further, profes-
sional reputations and academic careers are made or broken on 
what therapy “wins.” These career issues also serve as inescap-
able conflicts of interest.  
Furthermore, remember that there is not one “anointed” 
professional society for a specific disease or therapy. For exam-
ple, a large number of professional societies are active in the 
cancer world. These can be divided by specialty or by disease.107 
Conclusions and approaches may well vary between profession-
al societies. The viewpoint of a surgical society may well favor 
surgical interventions while radiologists may well favor a dif-
ferent therapeutic approach. The conclusions of any one such 
professional association are subject to question given the poten-
tial biases involved. This also leads to the unaddressed issue of 
how to deal with conflicting or contradictory recommendations 
from different professional societies. And who decides which 
professional society is right when there is some disagreement? 
Epstein seemingly leaves this for individual physicians to sort 
out, which is probably an impossible task. 
E. VOLUNTARY PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS LACK 
TRANSPARENCY, PROCEDURAL RIGHTS, AND ACCOUNTABILITY  
The FDA processes have a significant level of transparen-
cy108 and are subject to the democratic processes. FDA decisions 
 
 107. See, e.g., Laurie Barclay, New Breast Cancer Screening Guidelines 
Opposed by Societies, MEDSCAPE MEDICAL NEWS, Nov. 19, 2009, http://www 
.medscape.com/viewarticle/712720 (documenting recent controversy between 
several professional societies over mammograms and breast cancer). 
 108. While there are often complaints about a lack of transparency at the 
FDA (and many of these complaints are justified), the FDA has publicly an-
nounced initiatives to improve transparency, including the creation of a trans-
parency task force. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Transparency Task Force, 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/FDATransparencyTaskForce/default 
.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2010). Congress also has enacted transparency re-
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are often made after public meetings. New regulatory policies 
must go through the notice and comment administrative law 
processes. Lesser matters may go through good guidance prac-
tices which include public notice and the opportunity to com-
ment.109 Any aggrieved party can petition the FDA to adopt or 
change its policies through administrative law provisions.110 
The FDA publishes various notices regarding product approv-
als, labeling changes, recalls, and product withdrawals. In 
short, the FDA has transparency and procedural rights and 
remedies which simply do not and cannot exist within a private 
medical association. 
Likewise, the FDA can be held accountable by elected offi-
cials. Government oversight hearings are a part of life for the 
FDA. Different administrations have different policy priorities 
and policy views. The Commissioner of the FDA must be ap-
proved by the Senate. The press routinely praises or, more 
commonly, criticizes FDA actions. There are obvious differences 
between FDA policies under the Obama administration and 
policies under the Bush administration. Voluntary medical as-
sociations answer only to their members. If we assign the gate-
keeper role to voluntary medical associations, the lack of any 
meaningful accountability, transparency, or oversight renders 
such a system less responsible to popular will than is true un-
der the FDA. 
This accountability and transparency is particularly criti-
cal when one realizes that, in the end, the decision to approve a 
new drug or device is based on public policy, balancing risk and 
benefit. This is not a pure scientific decision; rather, science is 
one key input into the risk/benefit decision. The debate over 
access to HIV/AIDS drugs is just one example of product ap-
provals being a public policy balancing act.111 Transferring pub-
lic policy decisions to private entities violates democratic prin-
ciples.  
 
lated statutes (such as the Freedom of Information Act and the Federal Advi-
sory Committee Act (FACA)) to mandate transparency. Congress also exercis-
es an oversight role to ensure adequate transparency. No such mechanisms 
exist for private medical associations. 
 109. 21 C.F.R. § 10.115 (2009). 
 110. Id. § 10.30. 
 111. The passage of accelerated access and approval provisions for life 
threatening diseases such as AIDS as set forth in provisions such as 21 U.S.C. 
§ 356 (2006) and 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb (2006) are examples of public pressure 
changing access rules.  
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F. THE EXISTENCE OF FDA LABELING GENERALLY DOESN’T 
PRECLUDE DIFFERENT PRACTICE GUIDELINES OR 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Having said all of this, whatever role or benefit voluntary 
medical associations can and should play in defining practice 
guidelines and advising on therapeutic options, it already ex-
ists today. Whatever value they might offer is already within 
reach. These entities should be continually encouraged to play 
a significant role in assessing product performance, working 
towards product approvals, providing expert input to the FDA, 
developing practice guidelines, analyzing data, conducting re-
search, and advancing medical care in general. However, this 
does not mean that these groups are in a position to supplant 
the FDA. Furthermore, has anyone asked whether these asso-
ciations want this responsibility? 
  CONCLUSION   
The crux of Epstein’s argument is that the current FDA 
oversight system deprives patients (and their physicians) of 
complete control over therapeutic decisions because the FDA 
must approve a medical product for some use before it is avail-
able to the public. Thus, he argues, the FDA is impinging on 
personal freedom and maximal medical choice. To remedy this, 
he proposes to eliminate “permititis” by reducing the FDA to an 
advisory/information role (post-Phase I safety determinations) 
and by elevating private medical groups to serve as the key ga-
tekeeper responsible for identifying safe and effective thera-
pies.  
Has Epstein raised a critical issue? The answer is clearly 
“yes.” Has Epstein found the answer? I think not. I differ from 
him on policy grounds because his construct almost completely 
devalues two of the key missions of the FDA: enhancing patient 
outcomes and protecting the patient/consumer. Even if one is 
inclined to agree with Epstein’s philosophical views, history 
and logic demonstrate that his solution simply doesn’t work in 
real life and has been repeatedly rejected by the body politic. 
Individual patients, physicians, or volunteer medical associa-
tions simply cannot be expected to have the expertise, re-
sources, time, or inclination to collect and analyze all of the da-
ta on each specific therapy and otherwise to do the FDA’s job.112  
 
 112. There are obvious constitutional questions with assigning actual gov-
ernment authority to a nongovernmental entity. See, e.g., United States v. An 
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The current regulatory system is not perfect. Reforms and 
ongoing improvements are clearly needed. But the answer is to 
constantly work to fix and optimize the system, not to eliminate 
it. As history shows, turning the FDA into merely an advisory 
or informational entity will harm patients.  
In the end, Epstein raises a question that has vexed policy 
makers for decades. I appreciate the issue but the answer is not 
to turn back the clock seventy-five years. Epstein has raised 
the right question, but delivered the wrong answer.  
 
 
Article of Drug Ova II, 414 F. Supp. 660 (D. N.J. 1975) (discussing “drugs” in 
interstate commerce). As such, Epstein correctly argues for a voluntary role 
for medical associations and physicians rather than a legal, authoritative role. 
In such a situation, there is, at most, limited recourse if such a voluntary 
group either does not fulfill this task or fulfills it negligently. Likewise, there 
is little or no accountability, transparency, or structured process for public in-
put into the decisions of voluntary organizations.  
